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The American Law Institute's Restatement of
the Law of Contracts with Annotations to
the Washington Decislons*
Chapter 3
FORMATION OF INFORMAL CONTRACTS **
Section 27 AucTioNs, SALES WITHOUT RESERVE.
At an auction, an auctioneer merely invites offers from
successive 'bidders unless, by announcing that the sale is
without reserve or by other means, he indicates that he is
making an offer to sell at any price bid by the highest bidder.
Comment
a. An auction as ordinarily conducted furnishes an illustration
of the principle stated in Section 25. The auctioneer, by beginning
to auction property, does not impliedly say "I offer to sell this
property to whichever one of you makes the highest bid," but
rather requests that the bidders make offers to him, as indeed he
frequently states in his remarks to those before him.
b. It is a corollary of the principle stated in this Section taken
in connection with Section 41 that, where the auctioneer merely
invites offers, a bidder may withdraw his bid at any time before
the fall of the hammer. A bid in such a case is a revocable offer.
If the auctioneer has made an offer inviting acceptances, a bid Is an
acceptance and completes a contract, binding both auctioneer and
bidder; but the contract is conditional on no higher bid being
made before the fall of the hammer.
Section 28. To WHOM AN 0iTE AY BE MADE.
An offer may be made to specified person or persons or
class of persons, or it may be made to anyone or to everyone
to whom it becomes known. The person or persons in
whom is created a power of acceptance are to be determined
by the reasonable interpretation of the offer.
Comment
a. An offer may give many persons a power of acceptance. In
some such cases the exercise of the power by one person will extin-
gish the power of every other person, in other cases this will not
be true. The decision depends on interpretation of the offer.
* The absence of annotations to particular sections of the restatement
indicates that no Washington decisions have been found on the principle
therein stated. The sections dealing with the definition of terms, obviously
require no annotations.
** Continued from last issue.
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Section 29. How AN OFFER MAY BE ACCEPTED.
An offer may invite an acceptance to be made by merely
an affirmative answer, or by performing or refraimng from
performing a specified act, or may contain a choice of terms
from which the offeree is given the power to make a selec-
tion in his acceptance.
Section 30. OFFER MAY PROPOSE A SINGLE CONTRACT OR A
NUMBER OF CONTRACTS.
An offer may propose the formation of a single contract
by a single acceptance or the formation of a number of
contracts by successive acceptances from time to time.
Comment.
a. An offer may request several acts or promises as the indivisible
exchange for the promise or promises in the offer, or it may request
a series of contracts to be made from time to time. Such a series
may be a series of unilateral contracts or a series of bilateral con-
tracts, depending upon the terms of the offer. 'Whether several
promises create several contracts or are all part of one contract
is determined by principles of interpretation stated in Chapter 9.
Section 31. PRESUMPTION THAT OFFER INVITES A BILATERAL
CONTRACT.
In case of doubt it is presumed that an offer invites the
formation of a bilateral contract by an acceptance amount-
ing in effect to a promise by the offeree to perform what
the offer requests, rather than the formation of one or more
unilateral contracts by actual performance on the part of
the offeree.
Comment-
a. It is not always easy to determine whether an offeror requests
an act or a promise to do the act. As a bilateral contract imme-
diately and fully protects both parties, the interpretation is favored
that a bilateral contract is proposed.
Section 32. OFFER MUST BE REASONABLY CERTAIN IN ITS TERMS.
An offer must be so definite in its terms, or require such
definite terms in the acceptance, that the promises and
performances to be rendered by each party are reasonably
certain.
Comment.
a. Inasmuch as the law of contracts deals only with duties defined
by the expressions of the parties, the rule of this Section is one of
necessity as well as of law The law cannot subject a person to a
contractual duty or give another a contractual right unless the
character thereof is fixed by the agreement of the parties. A state-
ment by A that he will pay B what A chooses is no promise. A
promise by A to give B employment is not wholly illusory, but if
neither the character of the employment nor the compensation
therefor is stated, the promise is so indefinite that the law cannot
enforce it, even if consideration is given for it.
b. Promises may be indefinite in time or m place, or in the work
or the property to be given in exchange for the promise. In deal-
ing with such cases the law endeavors to give a sufficiently clear
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meaning to offers and promises where the parties intended to enter
into a bargain, but in some cases tins is impossible.
c. Offers which are originally too indefinite may later acquire
precision and become valid offers, by the subsequent words or acts
of the offeror or his assent to words or acts of the offeree.
A NNoTTioN:
A contract between two promoters of a sawmill company, who had each
subscribed for one-third of its capital stock, and a third party by which
the latter, in consideration of his purchase of the remaining one-third of
the capital stock, should have "the option to come into the mill and take
part in its management on the same terms as ourselves" is too indefinite
to be specifically enforced as it does not guarantee to the third person
any particular office in the corporation or necessarily imply that he shall
have the same salary as the other contracting parties: Hampton v.
Buchanan, 51 W. 155, 98 P. 874 (1908). A contract for the purchase
of water rights by the owners of 500 acres of land "for the purpose of
irrigating the following described lands" (comprising 2,500 acres) "pro
rata" and which prescribes that the rights agreed to be purchased "shall
be in all essential respects the same as those described in the blank con-
tract hereto annexed-in so far as the same may be made to apply under
this agreement," and the terms of the two contracts are irreconcilable, is
so indefinite and uncertain that it can not be enforced: Pasco Reclamation
Co. v. Cox, 70 W 549, 127 P. 107 (1912). Recovery can not be had
for breach of an agreement to form a corporation by which each party
agrees to subscribe for and purchase a specified amount of its capital
stock, where none of the essentials to the organization of a corporation,
such as corporate name, purpose, amount of capital stock and number of
shares, number and names of trustees, and principal place of business,
have been agreed upon: Watson v. Bayliss, 71 W 499, 128 P. 1061 (1913).
A written agreement by which the parties thereto agree to form a
corporation for the manufacture of shoes with a capital stock of $80,000,
to be contributed equally by the parties thereto, each of whom is to forfeit
$2,500 In default of performance of the agreement, is too indefinite to be
binding, the agreement not specifying under the laws of what state incor-
poration is to be made, the place of doing business, the pay value of the
shares, or the directors: Weldon v'. Degan, 86 W 442, 150 P. 1184 (1915).
A contract by which the defendant agreed that if she should there-
after decide to erect a building in either Seattle or Everett, she would
employ the plaintiff architect to draw the plans and superintend the con-
struction, the contract not specifying the terms of the employment, is too
indefinite to be enforced: Ryan v. Hanna, 89 W 379, 154 P. 436 (1916)
Where defendant, in reply to plaintiff's request for one to five cars Star
shingles at $2, telegraphed, "Stars all sold out. Quote two fifteen additional
business," to which plaintiff responded, "Book us five cars Stars two
fifteen. Advise return wire how soon can ship," to which defendant made
no reply, no contract was concluded because, even if defendant's language,
"Quote two fifteen additional business," be construed as an offer of prices,
there was no agreement as to the number of cars or time or place of de-
livery, Ch nolc Lumber d Shtngle Co. v. McLane Lumber & Shzngle Co.,
107 W 587, 182 P. 625 (1919). A contract for the purchase of a new
automobile is not established by proof that the owner of an old car left
it with dealers to be sold and the proceeds applied on account of the con-
templated purchase of a new automobile, the terms of which were not
otherwise agreed upon, and the parties after sale of the old car could not
agree upon the terms of payment for the new one: Morrson v. Ahrens, 131
W 310, 230 P. 137 (1924). The agreement of a pawnbroker who
loaned $50 upon the security of a ring as a pawn, that the pledgor might
reclaim the ring by the payment of $65 within a year or $75 after one
year, is not unilateral because of the indefiniteness of the time of redemp-
tion, as redemption may be made within a reasonable time after the
expiration of one year- Andrews v. Uncle Joe Dtamond Broker, 44 W 668,
87 P. 947 (1906). A contract upon which the lessee, upon the expira-
tion of his lease, is given the right to demand a new lease "for such period
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as may then be agreed upon at a yearly rental then to be agreed upon,"
or to be determined by arbitration in case of disagreement, is not so un-
certain as to warrant refusal of specific performance, especially where
the tenant is required to use the premises for factory purposes, and, upon
termination of the new lease, to restore the land to cultivable condition,
since the reservation of a "yearly rental" implies that the tenant is en-
titled to at least a lease for two years: Faucett v. Northern Clay Co., 84
W 382, 146 P 857 (1915).
Section 33. AN INDEFINITE OFFER MAY CREATE A CONTRACT
UPON PERFORMANCE BY OFFEREE.
An offer which is too indefinite to create a contract if
verbally accepted, may, by entire or partial performance
on the part of the offeree, create a contract.
ANNoTATION-
Where plaintiffs, under a contract to furnish defendants the "necessary
funds to assist in financing and performing" a contract which defendants
had with third parties for the construction of a railroad, for which plain-
tiffs were to have one-third of the profits, had advanced $10,000 to de-
fendants which they used in the execution of the construction contract,
an action by plaintiffs for their share of the profits can not be defeated
on the ground that the contract sued upon was void for uncertainty and
indefiniteness in that it failed to specify the amount of financial aid plain-
tiffs were to furnish, where the construction contract had been completed,
final payments therefor received and the contract between the parties
fully performed except with respect to the division of profits: McDougall
v. McDonald, 86 W 334, 150 P 628 (1915)
Section 34. OFFER UNTiL TERMINATED MAY BE ACCEPTED.
An offer until terminated gives to the offeree a continu-
ing power to create a contract by acceptance of the offer.
Section 35. How AN OFFER MAY BE TERMINATED, EFFECT OF
TERMINATION.
(1) An offer may be terminated by
(a) rejection by the offeree, or
(b) lapse of time, or the happening of a condition stated
in the offer as causing termination, or
(c) death or destruction of a person or thing essential
for the performance of the proposed contract, or
(d) supervening legal prohibition of the proposed con-
tract;
or, except as stated in Sections 45, 46 and 47, by
(e) revocation by the offeror, or
(f) the offeror's death or such insanity as deprives him
of legal capacity to enter into the proposed contract.
(2) Where an offer is terminated in one of these ways
a contract cannot be created by subsequent acceptance.
ANNOTATION :
(1) (b). An offer to a stockholder to return to him his promissory
notes, executed in favor of a corporation, upon his surrender for cancella-
tion of his shares of stock in said corporation, which was not accepted
until after the lapse of more than a year, can not be enforced. Libby v.
Packwood, 11 W 176, 39 P 647 (1895)
(1) (e). A memorandum delivered to a bank, authorizing payment for
certain corporate stock if delivered within thirty days, may be rescinded
any time before delivery of the stock: Hern v. Scandinaman-Amencan
Bank, 65 W 569, 118 P 648 (1911) A contractor making a bid for
the doing of construction work under an invitation reserving the right
to reject any and all bids, may withdraw the bid and enjoin the cashing
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or transfer of his accompanying certified check at any time before accept-
ance of the bid: Seattle Construction & Dry Dock Co. v. Newell, 81 W 144,
142 P. 481 (1914).
Section 36. WHAT IS A REJECTION OF AN OFFER.
An offer is rejected when the offeror is justified in in-
ferring from the words or conduct of the offeree that the
offeree intends not to accept the offer or to give it further
consideration.
Comment.
a. This Section states a general definition of what amounts to
a rejection. The more particular rules in the two following Sec-
tions state the common methods of rejection.
Section 37 COmmUNICATION BY OFFERER DECLINING THE
OFFER IS A REJECTION.
A communication from the offeree to the offeror, stating
in effect that the offeree declines to accept the offer is a re-
jection.
Section 38. COUNTER-OFFER BY OFFERER IS A REJECTION.
A counter-offer by the offeree, relating to the same mat-
ter as the original offer, is a rejection of the original offer,
unless the offeree at the same time states in express terms
that he is still keeping the original offer under advisement.
Comment.
a. A counter-offer amounts in legal effect to a statement by the
offeree not only that he is willing to do something different in re-
gard to the matter proposed, but also that he will not agree to the
proposal of the offeror. A counter-offer must fulfill the require-
ments of an original offer. There is none unless there is a mam-
festation sufficient to create a power of acceptance in the original
offeror. This distinguishes a counter-offer from a mere inquiry
regarding the possibility of different terms, a request for a better
offer, or a comment upon the terms of the offer. Likewise, an offer
dealing with an entirely new matter and not proposed as a sub-
stitution for the original offer is not a counter-offer.
A .INoTATio :
Where a contract for the purchase of real estate, prepared by the agent
of the owner, and executed by the plaintiff, provided for a cash payment
and fixed the time and amount in which deferred payments should be
made, with the rate of interest thereon, but did not provide for attorney's
fees or for acceleration of the maturity of deferred payments in case of
default, and stipulated that the contract was to be approved by the owner,
tender by the owner of a deed, together with notes for the deferred pay-
ments and a mortgage to secure the same, each of the notes and the mort-
gage containing a provision that in case the interest was not paid semi-
annually, the whole sum of principal and interest should be immediately
due at the holder's option, was a refusal of the contract as made by his
agent and the proffer of a sale, upon new conditions, and plaintiff could
recover the earnest money paid by hin: Bridge v. Calhoun, Denny &
Ewing, 57 W 272, 106 P. 762 (1910).
Section 39. TimE WHEN REJECTION IS EFFECTIVE.
Rejection by mail or telegram does not destroy the power
of acceptance until received by the offeror, but limits the
power so that a letter or telegram of acceptance started
after the sending of the rejection is only a counter-offer un-
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less the acceptance is received by the offeror before he
receives the rejection.
Section 40. WHAT LAPSE OF TIME TERMINATES AN OFFER.
(1) The power to create a contract by acceptance of an
offer terminates at the time specified in the offer, or, if no
time is specified, at the end of a reasonable time.
(2) What is a reasonable time is a question of fact, de-
pending on the nature of the contract proposed, the usages
of business and other circumstances of the case which the
offeree at the time of his acceptance either knows or has
reason to know
(3) In the absence of usage or a provision in the offer to
the contrary, and subject to the rule stated in Section 51, an
offer sent by mail is seasonably accepted if an acceptance
is mailed at any time during the day on which the offer is
received.
Comment
a. An offeror may fix any time that he wishes as that within
which acceptance must be made. He need not make the time a
reasonable one. If, however, no time is fixed the offeree is justified
in assuming that a reasonable time is intended, and the law adopts
this assumption.
b. Where a bilateral contract is contemplated a reasonable time
for making the return promise requested is generally brief. Especi-
ally is this true in regard to commercial contracts.
c. Where a unilateral contract is contemplated, assent to the
proposition is manifested by performing or refraining from per-
forming an act, and a reasonable time for so doing is necessarily a
reasonable time for acceptance. If, therefore, in the nature of the
case what is requested cannot be done without considerable delay,
the time within which acceptance may be made is equally long.
Section 41. REVOCATION BY COMMUNICATION FROM OFFEROR
RECEIVED BY OFFEREE.
Revocation of an offer may be made by a communication
from the offeror received by the offeree which states or
implies that the offeror no longer intends to enter into the
proposed contract, if the communication is received by the
offeree before he has exercised his power of creating a con-
tract by acceptance of the offer.
Comment
a. Revocation, as stated in Section 35, does not terminate an
offer in cases within the rules stated in Sections 45, 46 and 47
b. What amounts to receipt of revocation within the meaning
of the rule is considered in Section 69.
Section 42. ACQUISITION BY OFFEREE OF INFORMATION THAT
OFFEROR HAS SOLD OR CONTRACTED TO SELL OFFERED INTEREST.
Where an offer is for the sale of a property interest of
any kind, if the offeror, after making the offer, sells or con-
tracts to sell the interest to another person, and the offeree




a. Since revocation does not terminate offers falling within the
rules stated in Sections 45, 46 and 47, the present Section has no
application to such offers.
Section 43. How AN OFFER MADE By ADVERTiSEMENT OR GEx-
EAL NOTICE MAY BE REVoKED.
An offer made by advertisement in a newspaper, or by a
general notice, to the public or to a number of persons
whose identity is unknown to the offeror, is revoked by an
advertisement or general notice given publicity equal to
that given to the offer.
Comment
a. In the case of such an offer as is stated in this Section, revo-
cation is not likely to be inoperative within the rules stated in
Sections 45 and 46, but the rule stated in Section 47 may prevent
a revocation within the rule of the present Section from being
operative.
Section 44. REVOCATION OF OFFER CONTEMPLATING A SERIS
OF CONTRACTS.
A revocable offer contemplating a series of independent
contracts by separate acceptances may be effectively re-
voked so as to terminate the powder to create future con-
tracts, though one or more of the proposed contracts have
already been formed by the offeree's acceptance.
Comment
a. An offer may propose several contracts, to arise at separate
times (see Section 30) Such an offer is.divisible, and the power
to make an effective revocation continues pan, passu with the con-
tinuing power of the offeree to accept.
b. Where an offer contemplates a series of unilateral contracts,
beginning performances of the consideration for any one of the
series makes the offer for that one irrevocable (see Sections 45 and
52)
Section 45. REVOCATiON OF OFFER FOR UNILATERAL CONTRACT,
EFFECT OF PART PERFORMANCE OR TENDER.
If an offer for a unilateral contract is made, and part of
the consideration requested in the offer is given or tendered
by the offeree in response thereto, the offeror is bound
by a contract, the duty of immediate performance of which
is conditional on the full consideration being given or tend-
ered within the time stated in the offer, or, if no time is
stated therein, within a reasonable time.
Comment
a. What is rendered must be part of the actual performance
requested in order to preclude revocation under this Section. Be-
ginning preparations though they may be essential to carrying out
the contract or to accepting the offer, is not enough.
b. Tender, however, is sufficient. Though not the equivalent of
performance, nevertheless it is obviously unjust to allow so late
withdrawal. There can be no actionable duty on the part of the
offeror until he has received all that he demanded, or until
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the condition is excused by his own prevention of performance by
refusing a tender, but he may become bound at an earlier day It
may be fairly contended that the main offer includes as a subsidiary
promise, necessarily implied, that if part of the requested per-
formance is given, the offeror will not revoke his offer, and that if
tender is made it will be accepted. Part performance or tender
may thus furnish consideration for the subsidiary promises. M £ore-
over, merely acting m justifiable reliance on an offer may m some
cases serve as sufficient reason for making a promise binding (see
Section 90)
Section 46. OFFERS WHICH ARE THEMSELVES CONTRACTS CAN-
NOT BE TERMINATED.
An offer for which such consideration has been given or
received as is necessary to make a promise binding, or
which is in such form as to make a promise in the offer bind-
ing irrespective of consideration, cannot be terminated dur-
ing the time fixed in the offer itself or, if no time is fixed,
within a reasonable time, either by revocation or by the
offeror's death or insanity
Section 47 OFFERS WHICH OFFEROR HAS COLLATERALLY CON-
TRACTED TO KEEP OPEN CANNOT BE TERMINATED.
An offer cannot be terminated during the term therein
stated, or if no term is therein stated for a reasonable time,
either by revocation or by the offeror's death or insanity, if
by a collateral contract the offeror has undertaken not to
revoke the offer.
Comment.
a. The promise of the offer itself may be a contract (see Sections
24, 46) For practical purposes the situation is the same where
the offer is accompanied by a collateral contract to keep the offer
open. This collateral contract is in effect specifically enforced
without suit by denying the offeror the power to terminate his offer.
b. Whether a contract based on such an offer as is within the rule
stated either in this Section or in Section 46 can itself be specifical-
ly enforced, or, if not, what damages are recoverable if the offeror
repudiates or refuses to perform the contract, is determined by
the law governing the performance of contracts.
Section 48. TERMINATION OF OFFER BY OFFEROR'S DEATH OR
INSANITY.
A revocable offer is terminated by the offeror's death or
such insanity as deprives him of legal capacity to enter
into the proposed contract.
Section 49. TERMINATION OF OFFER BY DEATH OF ESSENTIAL
PERSON OR DESTRUCTION OF ESSENTIAL THING.
Where a proposed contract requires for its performance
the existence of a specific person or thing, and before ac-
ceptance the person dies or the thing is destroyed, the offer
is terminated unless the offeror assumes the risk of such
mischance.
Comment.
a. If the essential person is not dead, but ill or otherwise appar-
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ently disabled or the essential thing is injured, it cannot be said
that the offer is automatically terminated, though such facts may
justify the offeror in refusing to fulfill any contract formed by
acceptance.
Section 50. TERmATION oF OFFER BY ILLEGALITY.
Where after the making of an offer and before accept-
ance the proposed contract becomes illegal the offer is
terminated.
Section 51. EFFECT OF DELAY IN ComuNIcAmoN oF OFFER.
If communication of an offer to the offeree is delayed, the
period within which a contract can be created by accept-
ance is not thereby extended if the offeree knows or has
reason to know of the delay, though it is due to the fault
of the offeror; but if the delay is due to the fault of the
offeror or to the means of transmission adopted by him, and
the offeree neither knows nor has reason to know that there
has been delay, a contract can be created by acceptance
within the period which would have been permissible if the
offer had been despatched at the time that its arrival seems
to indicate.
Section 52. ACCEPTANCE oF OFFER DEFInED.
Acceptance of an offer is an expression of assent to the
terms thereof made by the offeree in a manner requested or
authorized by the offeror. If anything except a promise is
requested as consideration no contract exists until part of
what is requested is performed or tendered. If a promise
is requested, no contract exists, except as qualified by Sec-
tion 63, until that promise is expressly or impliedly given.
Comment
a. In a unilateral contract the act requested and performed as
consideration for the contract ordinarily indicates acceptance as
well as furnishes the consideration, and, under Section 45, per-
forming or tendering part of what is requested may both indicate
assent and furnish consideration. In a proposal for a bilateral con-
tract the mere assent of the offeree, whether manifested by words
or acts, is by implication the promise requested and therefore here
also mutual assent and consideration are indicated by the offeree
at one and the same time.
b. A bilateral contract by definition consists of mutual promises.
It is therefore essential that the offeree shall give the promise
requested by the offeror, and doing this clearly indicates accept-
ance of the offer. The fact that this promise is given may be
shown by any words or acts which indicate the offeree's assent
to the proposed bargain.
c. As appears from Section 64 acceptance may be complete as
soon as it is started on its way
ANNOTATION
An offer by G to H that if H would purchase certain mimng claims
and hold a one-fourth interest therein in trust for G, H should have a
one-fourth interest in all mineral claims thereafter located by either
G or W or both of them, is not accepted so as to become a contract until
H has purchased said mining claims; and H is not entitled to any interest
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in a mineral claim located by G and W in the interval between the making
of said offer and the purchase by H of said mining claims: Ranahan 'v.
Gibbons, 23 W 255, 62 P. 773 (1900). An agreement to purchase all cedar
poles that plaintiff may deliver at a certain railroad spur during the year
1921, being in the nature of a continuing offer, is accepted and converted
into an enforceable contract by plaintiff's delivery of poles at the place
during the year designated. Laswell v. Anderson, 127 W 591, 221 P. 300
(1923). The promise of a vendor not to declare a forfeiture of a contract
for the sale of land for five years if the vendee would remain on the land
and cultivate it and plant an apple orchard thereon, and that at the
end of said five years, if the vendee had not previously paid for the
land, there would be an abundance of fruit growing on the land to pay
for the same, is void for indefiniteness and lack of mutuality, the vendee
not being bound to remain on the land, or to cultivate it or to pay
for it within five years: Spokane Canal Co. v. Coffman, 61 W 357, 112
P 383 (1910). The agreement of defendant that if, at any time, he
should purchase a certain timber tract, he would do so through the plaintiff
and pay him a commission if plaintiff was then engaged in the brokerage
business, is lacking in mutuality and not supported by sufficient consid-
eration where the only consideration therefor is the agreement of the
plaintiff to use his best efforts to secure the timber for defendant at the
lowest possible price and to represent the defendant and protect his inter-
ests, since the plaintiff did not obligate himself to sell to defendant, or
to purchase as his agent, or to refrain from selling to someone else: Brown
v. Brew, 99 W 560, 169 P 992 (1918) The agreement of a corporation
to provide facilities for the warehousing and loading of a grower's fruit is
void for lack of mutuality, where the grower agrees to have all fruit
delivered packed in plainly marked boxes with grade variety and sizes
stamped thereon, and to pay 7y cents per box for all fruit delivered, but
does not agree to deliver any fruit: Brewster Distrct Unit v. Monroe, 117
W 21, 200 P 841 (1921). A promise to employ a lawyer to do the law
work of the promissor, without an agreement on the part of the lawyer to
do the work, is unenforceable for lack of mutuality- Osner & Melhorn v.
Loewe, 111 W 550, 191 P 746 (1920). The written agreement of an ice
company to sell ice to a certain dealer during the ice season at a certain
price per ton, in consideration of the dealer's "soliciting and delivering ice"
in a certain district, upon which writing the dealer wrote "Accepted," is
unenforceable for lack of mutuality or consideration since the dealer made
no promise to solicit, deliver, or buy ice. (Inasmuch as the offer was not
made for a promise, but for acts, it seems that even if the word "Accepted"
could be construed as a promise to solicit, deliver, or buy ice, it would not
be an acceptance of the offer.) Mowbray Pearson Co. v. E. H. Stanton Co.,
109 W 601, 187 P 370, 190 P 330 (1920).
Section 53. NECESSITY FOR KNOWLEDGE OF OFFER.
The whole consideration requested by an offer must be
given after the offeree knows of the offer.
Comment
a. Consideration is defined in Section 75. In Section 53 no ref-
erence is made to the technical requirements of the sufficiency of
consideration, it is only stated that in order to constitute accept-
ance, whatever the offeror requests must be given.
Section 54. WHO MAY ACCEPT AN OFFER.
A revocable offer can be accepted only by or for the
benefit of the person to whom it is made.
Comment
a. The words "for the benefit of" are inserted to cover such
contracts as are permitted by Section 75 (2), namely those in which
the offeror's promise to B is conditional on an act being done or a
promise made by C m exchange for the offeror's promise. C's
act or promise is an acceptance.
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b. An offer may also be accepted by an agent of the offeree,
and even if one -who accepts, purporting to be such an agent is
not authorized by the offeree so to do, his act may be ratified,
but throughout the Re-statement of this Subject it is assumed, in
the absence of contrary statement, that any necessary act may be
done by an agent.
Section 55. ACCEPTANCE OF OFFER FOR UNMATERAL CONTRACT,
NECESSITY Op INTENT TO ACCEPT. 7
If an act or forbearance is requested by the offeror as the
consideration for a unilateral contract, the act or forbear-
ance must be given with the intent of accepting the offer.
comment.
a. When an offeror requests a certain act or forbearance as the
consideration for his promise, the act or forbearance when furnished
is an ambiguous expression of intent, since acts, like words, often
have more than one objective meaning. The reasonable interpre-
tation may be that the offeree accepts the proposal, but it is pos-
sible that the true interpretation is that the offeree as a free man
has exercised his privilege of acting or forbearing in the manner
requested, without accepting the proposal. The only way to de-
termine what Ins conduct actually means even objectively, is to
ascertain his intent.
b. This is not the same as saying that the offer must be the cause
of the acceptance. The offer 1i, indeed, usually the sole cause
of the acceptance, but frequently there are other causative fac-
tors, and occasionally contracts may exist where if the offer is
in any sense a cause of the acceptor's action it is so slight a factor
that a statement that the acceptance is caused by the offer is mis-
leading.
c. Except to the extent stated in Sections 71 and 72, no ques.
tion of intent to accept by words or acts apparently indicating
assent arises when a bilateral contract is proposed. If, in accord-
ance with Section 20, an offeree does acts with intent to do them
which indicate his assent to an offer of a bilateral contract com-
mumcated to him as required by Section 23, the offeree comes
under a duty to the offeror; and as he is bound by the contract,
he is also entitled to take advantage of it. Indeed, this is a necessary
consequence of the axiom that both parties to a bilateral contract
must be bound or neither is bound. Whereas -when a unilateral
contract is proposed and the offeree does the act requested, he may
do it either to make a gift or a bargain.
Section 56. ACCEPTANCE OF OFFER FOR UNILATERAL CONTRACT,
NECESSITY OF NOTICE TO OFFEROR.
Where forbearance or an act other than a promise is the
consideration for a promise, no notification that the act or
forbearance has been given is necessary to complete the
contract. But if the offeror has no adequate means of
ascertaining with reasonable promptness and certainty that
the act or forbearance has been given, and the offeree
should know this, the contract is discharged unless within a
reasonable time after performance of the act or forbear-
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ance, the offeree exercises reasonable diligence to notify
the offeror thereof.
Comment
a. In the formation of a unilateral contract where the offeror
is the party making the promise, as is almost invariably the case,
a compliance with the request in the offer fulfills the double func-
tion of a manifestation of acceptance and of giving consideration.
It is only in the exceptional case where the offeror has no con-
venient means of ascertaining whether the requested act has been
done that notice is requisite. Even then, it is not the notice which
creates the contract, but lack of the notice which ends the duty
ANNOTATION
The promise of a landlord to the creditor of his tenant to guarantee
the tenant's debt if the creditor would extend the time of payment to a
certain day, is binding where the creditor in reliance on the promise
forebore suit until after the day mentioned, although no formal com-
munication of acceptance was made by him. Palmer & Co. v. Chaffee, 129
W 408, 225 P 65 (1924) Where stockholders of a corporation re-
quested a bank to make advances to the corporation and guaranteed pay-
ment, without notice, of such advances, notice of acceptance by the bank
is not necessary to make the guaranty binding, where the bank made
advances to the corporation in reliance on the guaranty- Bank of Califor-
ma v. Union Packing Co., 60 W 456, 111 P 573 (1910)
Section 57 UNILATERAL CONTRACT WHERE PROPOSED ACT IS
TO BE DONE BY OFFEROR.
If in an offer of a unilateral contract the proposed act or
forbearance is that of the offeror, the contract is not com-
plete until the offeree makes the promise requested.
Comment
a. This Section covers a particular and rather peculiar case cov-
ered by the more general language of Section 52. It occurs only
where the performance of the offer automatically occurs at the
moment the promise requested is given. This may happen where
the proposal relates to the transfer of personal property The
very act of the acceptor in promising to pay the price may, if the
offer so specifies, transfer the ownership of the goods to the of-
feree.
Section 58. ACCEPTANCE MUST BE UNEQUIVOCAL.
Acceptance must be unequivocal in order to create a con-
tract.
Comment
a. An offeror is entitled to know in clear terms whether the of-
feree accepts his proposal. It is not enough that the words of a
reply jstify a probable inference of assent.
ANNOTATION
Retention by defendants, for several days, of plans for the mechanical
equipment of a hospital, submitted by plaintiff under a contract to fur-
nish such plans, and their indorsement of the same as "Approved," is not
such acceptance as to entitle plaintiff to recover the contract price where
there was evidence that defendants had no technical knowledge of what
such plans should consist of or require, that the plans were not workable,
and that such indorsement of approval is no more than an identification
or authentication and does not exempt the one offering the plans from
his implied contract to offer a workable plan. Moore v. Saunders, 88 W
602, 153 P 329 (1915).
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Section 59. ACCEPTANCE MUST COMPLY WrTU TERms OF
OFEIR.
Except as this rule is qualified by Sections 45, 63, 72, an
acceptance must comply exactly with the requirements of
the offer, omitting nothing from the promise or perform-
ance requested.
Comment.
a. This rule is a necessary corollary of the basic idea of con-
tracts that duties are nnposed by the law for only such performance
as the parties have expressed a willingness to assume.
AxNOTATION
Where one copy of a contract employing an attorney, signed by one
of the parties, provided, "In case said action is settled prior to judgment,
the first party is to receive fifteen per-cent of amount for which action
is settled," and the other copy, signed by the other party, by reason of an
interlineation therein, provided that in such case the first party is to re-
ceive fifteen per-cent of the amount of attorney's fees for which the action
is settled, there is no contract as to the amount of compensation, and the
attorney can recover only upon a quantum meruit: Thayer v. Harbzcan,
70 W 278, 126 P. 625 (1912). The acceptance, to constitute a binding
contract, must be as broad as the offer- any conditions in the nature of
new proposals attached to the offer must themselves be accepted: Cole-
man v. St. Paul & T. Lumber Co., 110 W 259, 188 P. 532 (1920).
Where the parties to a contract of employment of an architect both
contended that there was an express agreement with respect to the amount
of compensation to be paid the architect but differed as to what the amount
was, and the evidence left it doubtful whether the parties had agreed
upon the amount, a finding that no agreement was entered into is justi-
fied, and the architect may recover upon a quantum meruit: Holmes 1p.
Radford, 143 W 644, 255 P. 1039 (1927).
Section 60. PURPORTED ACCEPTANCE WmHICH ADDS QuALFmCA-
TIONS.
A reply to an offer, though purporting to accept it, which
adds qualifications or requires performance of conditions, is
not an acceptence but is a counter-offer.
Comment.
a. A qualified or conditional acceptance is a counter-offer, since
such an acceptance is a statement of what the person making it is
willing to do in exchange for what the original offeror proposed
to give. A counter-offer is a rejection of the original offer (see
Section 38 and Comment thereon). An acceptance, however, is
not inoperative as such merely because it is expressly conditional,
if the req-urement of the condition would be implied from the
offer, though not expressed therein.
ANNOTATION
A bid to do the public printing of a county at a specified rate of com-
pensation, which was accepted by the board of county commissioners upon
condition that the delinquent tax list should be included therein at the
same rate, which was not acceded to by the bidder, does not constitute a
contract which the bidder can enforce, notwithstanding that the clerk of
the board erroneously entered a minute that the contract was awarded
to said bidder, especially as it was understood that a written contract was
to be prepared and signed by the parties which was not done: Olympsan-
Tribune Pub. Co. v. Byrne, 28 W 79, 68 P. 335 (1902). Where
defendants by letter offered to supply plaintiffs with certain materials
at prices stated, and plaintiffs replied accepting the offer at the
prices stated, but fixing a time certain for the delivery of the materials
and defendants responded, "Should there be any question about us not
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being able to make the delivery required by you" will "advise you at
once of such time as we may be able to fill your order," and later tele-
graphed and wrote that on account of previous contracts they could not
fill the order, no contract resulted: Bringhan v. American Brzdge Co.,
39 W 3, 80 P. 788 (1905). Where defendant, upon the application of
plaintiff for a loan, wrote, offering to loan him $30,000 for five years at
5/2 %, and added, "We will expect, however, to write at least one-half of the
fire insurance carried on the building in our office," the reply of the
plaintiff, "I hereby accept the loan applied for-I agree to write $20,000
insurance through your office upon expiration of present policies," is not
an unconditional acceptance as it permits the writing of $20,000 only and
at expiration of existing policies, and does not present withdrawal of the
offer" Sillman v. Spokane Sav. & L. Soc., 103 W 619, 175 P 296 (1918).
Where defendant, in reply to plaintiff's offer, communicated through
an agent, to purchase defendant's land at a price and upon terms stated,
authorized the agent to accept plaintiff's deposit, but the agent's receipt
for plaintiff's deposit stated, "sale is subject to approval of owner of
premises," and defendant, when informed that he would be required to
pay certain taxes and accept a certain rate of interest on deferred pay-
ments, declined to assent thereto, there was no meeting of minds and no
binding contract: Kuk v. Lemeke, 107 W 45, 180 P 889 (1919)
Where, after exchange of several telegrams between parties negotiat-
ing for the purchase and sale of poles, defendant_ telegraphed, "Accept
proposition," but added, "Will mail acceptance on receipt of telegraphic
reply," and plaintiff, instead of wiring his assent, sent a telegraphic reply
materially changing date of delivery, terms of payment and price, which
changes were not assented to by defendant, no completed contract wao
consummated: Schulze v. General Electric Co., 108 W 401, 184 P 342
(1919)
Section 61. ACCEPTANCE OF OFFER WHICH STATES PLACE,
TIME OR MANNER OF ACCEPTANCE.
If an offer prescribes the place, time or manner of accept-
ance its terms in this respect must be complied with in order
to create a contract. If an offer merely suggests a permitted
place, time or manner of acceptance, another method of
acceptance is not precluded.
Comment
a. If the offeror prescribes the only way in which his offer must
be accepted, an acceptance in any other way is a counter-offer.
But frequently in regard to the details of methods of acceptance,
the offeror's language, if fairly interpreted, amounts merely to a
statement of a satisfactory method of acceptance, without positive
requirement that this method shall be followed.
Section 62. ACCEPTANCE WHICH REQUESTS CHANGE OF
TERMS.
An acceptance which requests a change or addition to the
terms of the offer is not thereby invalidated unless the
acceptance is made to depend on an assent to the changed
or added terms.
Section 63. EFFECT OF PERFORMANCE BY OFFEREE WHERE
OFFER REQUESTS PROMISE.
If an offer requests a promise from the offeree, and the
offeree without making the promise actually does or tenders
what he was requested to promise to do, there is a contract,
subject to the provisions of Section 56, provided that such
performance is completed or tendered within the time allow-
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able for accepting by making a promise. A tender in such a
case operates as a promise to render complete performance.
Comment.
a. This section states an exception to Sections 52 and 59. If
within the time allowed for accepting the offer full performance
has been given, the offeror has received something better than he
asked for and is bound, since the only object of requiring a promise
is ultimately to obtain performance of it. Begnnng to perform
within the time allowed for accepting the offer will not amount
to an acceptance, unless the offeror also gives an assurance that
performance will be completed.
Section 64. How ACCEPTANCE MAY BE TRANSMITTED, TIME
Wnim IT TAES EIECT.
An acceptance may be transmitted by any means which
the offeror has authorized the offeree to use and, if so
transmitted, is operative and completes the contract as soon
as put out of the offeree's possession, without regard to
whether it ever reaches the offeror.
Section 65. ACCEPTANCE BY TELEPHONE.
Acceptance given by telephone is governed by the prin-
ciples applicable to oral acceptances where the parties are
in the presence of each other.
Section 66. WHEN A PARTICULAR MEANS OF TRANSMISSION IS
AUTHORIZED.
An acceptance is authorized to be sent by the means
used by the offeror or customary in similar transactions at
the time when and the place where the offer is received,
unless the terms of the offer or surrounding circumstances
known to the offeree otherwise indicate.
Section 67 ACCEPTANCE BY MAIL OR FROM A DISTANCE, WHEN
VALID UPON DESPATCH.
An acceptance sent by mail or otherwise from a distance
is not operative when despatched, unless it is properly
addressed and any other precaution taken which is ordi-
narily observed to insure safe transmission of similar mes-
sages.
Section 68. WhEN AN ACCEPTANCE INOPERATIvE WHEN DES-
PATCHED IS OPERATIVE UPON RECEIPT BY OFPEROR.
An acceptance inoperative when despatched only because
the offeree uses means of transmission which he was not
authorized to use is operative when received, if received by
the offeror within the time within which an acceptance sent
in an authorized manner would probably have been re-
ceived by him.
Section 69. WHAT CONSTITUTES RECEIPT OF REVOCATION, RE-
JECTION, OR ACCEPTANCE.
A written revocation, rejection or acceptance is received
when the writing comes into the possession of the person
addressed, or of some person authorized by him to receive
it for him, or is deposited in some place which he has author-
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ized as the place for this or similar communications to be
deposited for him.
Comment
a. Under Section 41, a revocation when sent from a distance must
be received in order to be effectual. Under Section 64 acceptance
from a distance need not be received if started on its way in a
method authorized, unless receipt is made a condition of the offer.
This, however, may be the case, and though there is no such condi-
tion, an acceptance sent by an unauthorized method may, under
Section 68, create a contract when received by the offeror. What
amounts to receipt in all these cases is defined by the present Sec-
tion, under which a written communication may be received though
it is not read or though it does not even reach the hands of the
person to whom it is addressed.
Section 70. AN OFFEROR OR ACCEPTOR OF A WRITTEN OFFER IS
BOUND BY ITS TERMS.
One who makes a written offer which is accepted, or who
manifests acceptance of the terms of a writing which he
should reasonably understand to be an offer or proposed
contract, is bound by the contract, though ignorant of the
terms of the writing or of its proper interpretation.
Comment
a. The effect of fraud and mistake as ground for avoiding a
contract induced thereby is stated in a later portion of the Restate-
ment of this Subject. When mistake prevents the existence of a
contract is stated in Section 71.
Section 71. UNDISCLOSED UNDERSTANDING OF O'FEROR OR
OFFEREE, WHEN MATERIAL.
Except as stated in Sections 55 and 70, the undisclosed
understanding of either party of the meaning of his own
words and other acts, or of the other party's words and
other acts, is material in the formation of contracts in the
following cases and in no others.
(a) If the manifestations of intention of either party are
uncertain or ambiguous, and he has no reason to know that
they may bear a different meaning to the other party from
that which he himself attaches to them, his manifestations
are operative in the formation of a contract only in the
event that the other party attaches to them the same mean-
ing.
(b) If both parties know or have reason to know that
the manifestations of one of them are uncertain or ambigu-
ous and the parties attach different meanings to the mani-
festations, this difference prevents the uncerain or ambigu-
ous manifestations from being operative as an offer or an
acceptance.
(c) If either party knows that the other does not intend
what his words or other acts express, this knowledge pre-
vents such words or other acts from being operative as an
offer or an acceptance.
NOTES AND COMMENTS
comment.
a. The mental assent of the parties is not requisite for the for-
mation of a contract. If the words or acts of one of the parties
have but one reasonable meaning, his intention is material only m
the exceptional case, stated in Clause (e), that an unreasonable
meaning which he attaches to his manifestations is known to the
other party If the words or other acts of the parties have more
than one reasonable meaning, it must be determined which of the
possible meanings is to be taken. If either party has reason to
know that the other will give the words or acts only one of these
meanings and in fact the words or acts are so understood, the party
conscious of the ambiguity is bound in accordance with that under-
standing. On the other hand, if a party has no reason to suppose
that there is ambiguity, he may assert that his words or other acts
bear the meaning that he intended, that being one of their legiti-
mate meanings, and he -will not be bound by a different meaning
attached to them by the other party
ANNOTATION
Where the vendor of a carload of shingles delivered to a bank the order
bill of lading therefor, and assigned to it the invoice which bore a nota-
tion, "Due on or before 60 days from date of shipment," and upon these
documents obtained from the bank a loan represented by a draft, his
intention, not disclosed to the bank, to retain title to the shingles until
they were paid for, did not prevent recovery on the draft by the bank,
although it had forwarded the bill of lading to the purchaser, who thereby
obtained possession of the shingles but did not pay for them: Citizens
Bank & Trust Co. v. Everbest Shzngle Co., 135 W 575, 238 P. 644 (1925).
(b). Where defendant quoted plaintiff a price on potatoes of a de-
scribed grade, and a lower price for an inferior grade, and plaintiff, de-
siring the inferior grade, ordered one carload but did not specify the
grade desired, and defendant, believing the higher grade was ordered,
shipped a carload of that grade, there was no meeting of the mmds and
no contract: Mutual Sales Agency v. Hor, 145 W 236, 259 P 712 (1927)
Section 72. ACCEPTANcE BY S cmE E.
(1) Where an offeree fails to reply to an offer, his
silence and inaction operate as an acceptance in the follow-
ing cases and in no others.
(a) Where the offeree with reasonable opportunity to
reject offered services takes the benefit of them under cir-
cumstances which would indicate to a reasonable man that
they were offered with the expectation of compensation.
(b) Where the offeror has stated or given the offeree
reason to understand that -assent may be manifested by
silence or inaction, and the offeree in remaining silent and
inactive intends to accept the offer.
(c) Where because of previous dealings or otherwise,
the offeree has given the offeror reason to understand that
the silence or inaction is intended by the offeree as a mani-
festation of assent, and the offeror does so understand.
(2) Where the offeree exercises dominion over chattels
which are offered to him, such exercise of dominion in the
absence of other circumstances showing a contrary inten-
tion is an acceptance. If other circumstances indicate that
the exercise of dominion is tortious the offeror may at his
WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
option treat it as an acceptance, though the offeree man-
ifests an intention not to accept.
ANNOTATION
A contract to sell fish is not rescinded by a letter written by the
vendor to the vendee offering to rescind, to which the vendee made no
reply- Parks v. Elmore, 59 W 584, 110 P 381 (1910) An offer by
telephone to extend the time for closing a sale of real estate, to which no
response is made by the other party, does not establish a contract of
extension: Flood 'V. Von Marcard, 102 W 140, 172 P. 884 (1918) "Mere
silence when an offer is made does not constitute an acceptance of the
offer. The failure to reject an offer is not equivalent to assent"- Troyer
v. Fox, 162 W 537, 298 P 733 (1931)
Section 73. EFFECT OF RECEIPT BY OFFEROR OF A LATE OR
OTHERWISE DEFECTIVE ACCEPTANCE.
An offeror who receives an acceptance which is too late
or which is otherwise defective, cannot at his election re-
gard it as valid. The late or defective acceptance is a
counter-offer which must in turn be accepted by the original
offeror in order to create a contract.
Comment.
a. How such a counter-offer as is referred to in the last sentence
of the section may be accepted depends on the general principles
which govern acceptance. In some cases Subsections (b) or (e)
of Section 72 (1) may be applicable.
Section 74. TIME WHEN AND PLACE WHERE A CONTRACT IS
MADE.
A contract is made at the time when the last act necessary
for its formation is done, and at the place where that final
act is done.
ANNOTATION
Where negotiations in the state of Washington finally culminated in
a written contract formally entered into in the state of California, the
locus of the contract is in the latter state: Germck & Gernck v. Lleweflyn
Iron Works, 105 W 98, 177 P 692 (1919). A written agreement for
the distribution of motion picture films which contains a clause that
it shall not be binding until its contents are submitted to the president
of the distributor and accepted in writing by him, or "until this contract
is executed in writing by such president," is complete and binding as a
contract when signed by the distributor's president: United Artists Cor-
poration v. Praggastis, 144 W 284, 257 P. 843 (1927). Where parties,
negotiating for an exchange of properties, executed deeds and left them
with an agent, pending determination by one of them as to whether the
offer to exchange would be accepted by him, and the deeds were not to
be delivered until the agent was reotified of such acceptance, there was no
completed contract, the minds of the parties having met only as to mat-
ters preliminary to the ultimate exchange of properties: Nelson v. Davis,
102 W 313, 172 P 1178 (1918). *
* To be continued.
